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Abstract
Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within
the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a
convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the
notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper analyzes
axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the re-
lated notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic
models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover
model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice
under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent
expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized
via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification
preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion.
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1 Introduction
Another rule which may prove useful can be derived from our theory. This is
the rule that it is advisable to divide goods which are exposed to some danger
into several portions rather than to risk them all together.
– Daniel Bernoulli, 1738
The term diversification conveys the idea of introducing variety to a set of objects.
Conceptually, Bernoulli (1738) may have been the first to appreciate the benefits of diver-
sification in an economic context. In his fundamental 1738 article on the St. Petersburg
paradox, he argues by example that risk averse investors will want to diversify.
In finance, diversification is perhaps the most important of investment principles. Here,
it is roughly understood as the mitigation of overall portfolio risk by investing in a wide
variety of assets. The seminal work of Markowitz (1952) on portfolio theory laid the first
mathematical foundations for what we understand today under investment diversification
in finance. Markowitz’s portfolio theory provides a crucial formalization of the link between
the inseparable notions of diversification and risk; it postulates that an investor should
maximize portfolio return while minimizing portfolio risk, given by the return variance.
Hence, diversification in finance is equivalent to the reduction of overall risk (but not
generally its elimination). Interestingly, assuming that markets are populated by investors
as in Markowitz (1952), only non-diversifiable risk is priced at equilibrium, as shown by
the well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner
(1965), and Mossin (1966). Briefly, under the CAPM, investors are only rewarded for non-
diversifiable or systematic risk.
Diversification plays an equally important role in economic theory. The way in which
an individual economic agent makes a decision in a given choice theoretic model forms
the basis for how diversification is viewed. An economic agent who chooses to diversify
is understood to prefer variety over similarity. Axiomatically, a preference relation % on
a set of choices X exhibits preference for diversification if for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and
α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] for which
∑n
i=1 αi = 1,
x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn ⇒
n∑
i=1
αi xi % xj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
An individual will hence want to diversify among a collection of choices all of which are
ranked equivalently. This notion of diversification is equivalent to that of convexity of
preferences, which states that αx+ (1− α) y % y, for all α ∈ [0, 1], if x % y.
The most common example of diversification in the above choice theoretic sense is
within the universe of asset markets, where an investor faces a choice amongst risky posi-
tions, such as equities, derivatives, portfolios, etc. Such risky positions are usually modeled
as random variables on some state space Ω under a given objective reference probability
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P. Diversification across two equivalently ranked risky assets x and y is then expressed
by the state-wise convex combination αx(ω) + (1 − α) y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω and
α ∈ [0, 1]. In this context, preference for diversification means that an investor would
prefer to allocate a fraction α to asset x and a fraction 1− α to asset y rather than fully
invest in either one of the assets. Within traditional decision theory under risk, where
preferences are formed over lotteries, that is probability measures p : Z → [0, 1] over a
set of prizes Z, diversification has yet another interpretation. Here, a convex combination
α p+ (1− α) q of equally desirable lotteries p and q is defined by taking the convex com-
bination of each prize z separately, that is, (α p + (1 − α) q)(z) = α p(z) + (1 − α) q(z).
This convex combination of lotteries can be interpreted as some additional randomization,
since it corresponds to the sampling of either p or q depending on the outcome of a binary
lottery with probability α or 1− α.
The concepts of diversification and risk aversion are closely intertwined. In axiomatic
choice theory, risk aversion is roughly the preference for a certain outcome with a possibly
lower payoff over an uncertain outcome with equal or higher expected value. More pre-
cisely, a decision maker is said to be risk averse if the expected value of a random variable
with certainty is preferred to the random variable itself. Informally, one might say that
the goal behind introducing variety through diversification is the reduction of “risk” or
“uncertainty”, and so one might identify a diversifying decision maker with a risk averse
one. This is indeed the case in expected utility theory (EUT), where risk aversion and
preference for diversification are exactly captured by the concavity of the utility function.
However, this equivalence fails to hold in other models of choice.
Even though the desirability for diversification is a cornerstone of a broad range of
portfolio choice models in finance and economics, the precise formal definition differs from
model to model. Analogously, the way in which the notion of diversification is interpreted
and implemented in the investment management community varies greatly. Diversifying
strategies thus span a vast range, both in theory and in practice, from the classical ap-
proaches of Markowitz’s variance minimization and von-Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected
utility maximization, to the more naive approaches of equal weighting or increasing the
number of assets.
Diversification, in its essence, can be regarded as a choice heuristic that comes in
different forms. This article provides the first comprehensive overview of the various
existing formalizations of the notion of diversification from a choice theoretic perspective.
Different axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to related
notions of risk aversion are reviewed within some of the most common decision theoretic
frameworks. Motivated by Bernoulli’s realization of its financial and economic benefits,
we discuss the implications of each of the major definitions of diversification on portfolio
choice.
We start by setting up the theoretical choice theoretic framework in Section 2. Section
3 examines various choice theoretic axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and
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their relationship to convexity of preferences and concavity of utility. Given the intrinsic
link between risk aversion and diversification, Section 4 reviews common definitions of risk
aversion, including weak, strong and monotone risk aversion, and their inter-relationship.
Section 5 studies the connection between diversification preferences, convex preferences
and risk aversion under no particular model assumptions. Section 6 reviews the classic
results within the framework of expected utility theory, where all definitions of diversifi-
cation preferences as well as all notions of risk aversion coincide with the concavity of the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation. Section 7 considers the more general
rank-dependent expected utility model of Quiggin (1982), where the equivalence between
weak and strong risk aversion does not carry over from the expected utility model. Sim-
ilarly, the correspondence between risk aversion and preference for diversification does
not hold any longer. Section 8 extends the discussion from models of choice under risk
to models of choice under uncertainty. This covers decision models where there is no
given objective probability distribution on the set of states of the world, the axiomati-
zation of which is given by Choquet expected utility theory. Notions of diversification
and uncertainty aversion, rather than risk aversion, are discussed within such models of
expected utility under a non-additive subjective probability measure. Under uncertainty,
the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion roughly captures the preference for known risks
over unknown risks. In Section 9, we recall the most prominent definitions of ambiguity
aversion, link them to the notion of diversification and discuss the implications on portfolio
choice. Section 10 concludes with remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences
within models of behavioral choice.
2 Theoretical setup
We adopt the classical setup for risk assessment used in mathematical finance and portfolio
choice. We consider a decision maker who chooses from the vector space X = L∞(Ω,F ,P)
of essentially bounded real-valued random variables on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where
Ω is the set of states of nature, F is a σ-algebra of events, and P is a σ-additive prob-
ability measure on (Ω,F). Note that the decision maker is also able to form compound
choices represented by the state-wise convex combination αx+ (1−α) y for x, y ∈ X and
α ∈ [0, 1], defined by αx(ω)+(1−α) y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω. The space X is endowed
with the order x ≥ y ⇔ x(ω) ≥ y(ω) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω. Our assumption that the
outcome space is the set R of real numbers, which comes with an intrinsic ordering and
mixing operations, enables a natural monetary interpretation of outcomes.
A weak preference relation on X is a binary relation % satisfying:
(i) Completeness : For all x, y ∈ X , x % y ∨ y % x.
(ii) Transitivity : For all x, y, z ∈ X , x % y ∧ y % z ⇒ x % z.
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Every weak preference relation % on X induces an indifference relation ∼ on X defined by
x ∼ y ⇔ (x % y)∧ (y % x). The corresponding strict preference relation  on X is defined
by x  y ⇐⇒ x % y ∧ ¬(x ∼ y). A numerical or utility representation of the preference
relation % is a real-valued function u : X → R for which x % y ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y).
For x ∈ X , Fx denotes the cumulative distribution function of x, defined by Fx(c) =
P [x ≤ c] for c ∈ R, and e(x) is the expectation of x, that is, e(x) = ∫ c dFx(c). For
c ∈ R, δc denotes the degenerated random variable with δc(ω) = c for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
The certainty equivalent of x ∈ X is the value c(x) ∈ R such that x ∼ δc(x), i.e., c(x)
is the certain value which the decision maker views as equally desirable as a choice x
with uncertain outcome. The risk premium pi(x) of x ∈ X is the amount by which the
expected return of a choice x ∈ X must exceed the value of the guaranteed outcome in
order to make the uncertain and certain choices equally attractive. Formally, it is defined
as pi(x) = e(x)− c(x).
Monotonicity. Emulating the majority of frameworks of economic theory, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that decision makers prefer more to less. In particular, in view of the
monetary interpretation of the space X , a natural assumption on the preference relation
% is monotonicity.
(iii) Monotonicity : For all x, y ∈ X , x ≥ y =⇒ x % y.
Monotonicity of preferences is equivalent to having a strictly increasing utility function
u. Indeed, for x ≥ y, we have x % y and thus u(x) ≥ u(y). Monotonicity of the utility
function simply implies that an agent believes that “more is better”; a larger outcome
yields greater utility, and for risky bets the agent would prefer a bet which is first-order
stochastically dominant over an alternative bet.
Continuity. Continuity of preferences is often assumed for technical reasons, as it can
be used as a sufficient condition for showing that preferences on infinite sets can have
utility representations. It intuitively states that if x  y, then small deviations from x or
from y will not reverse the ordering.
(iv) Continuity : For every x  y, there exist neighborhoods Bx, By ⊆ X around x and
y, respectively, such that for every x′ ∈ Bx and y′ ∈ By, x′  y′.
Throughout this article, unless otherwise stated, we assume that preferences are both
monotonic and continuous. Debreu’s theorem (Debreu 1964) states that there exists a
continuous monotonic utility representation u of a monotonic and continuous preference
relation %.
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3 Rudiments of convexity, diversification, and risk
The notions of convex preferences, preferences for diversification, and risk are inherently
linked, both conceptually and mathematically. We recall the formal definitions and their
relationships.
3.1 Convex preferences
We begin with the mathematically more familiar concept of convexity. The notion of con-
vexity of preferences inherently relates to the classic ideal of diversification, as introduced
by Bernoulli (1738). To be able to express convexity of a preference relation, one assumes
a choice-mixing operation on X that allows agents to combine (that is diversify across)
several choices. By combining two choices, the decision maker is ensured under convexity
that he is never “worse off” than the least preferred of these two choices.
Definition 1 (Convex preferences). A preference relation % on X is convex if for all
x, y ∈ X and for all α ∈ [0, 1],
x % y =⇒ αx+ (1− α) y % y.
In mathematics and economic theory, convexity is an immensely useful property, par-
ticularly within optimization. The role it plays in the theory of choice leads to some
convenient results, because of what it says about the corresponding utility representation.
We recall some well-known properties of utility functions representing convex preferences.
Proposition 1. A preference relation % on X is convex if and only if its utility represen-
tation u : X → R is quasi-concave.
This means that convexity of preferences and quasi-concavity of utility are equivalent.
A direct corollary to this result is that concavity of utility implies convexity of preferences.
However, convex preferences may have numerical representations that are not concave.1
More strongly even, some convex preferences can be constructed in a way that does not
admit any concave utility representation.
3.2 Diversification preferences
An important property within the theory of choice is that of diversification. An economic
agent who chooses to diversify is understood to prefer variety over similarity. Axiomati-
cally, preference for diversification is formalized as follows; see Dekel (1989).
1To see this, suppose u is a concave utility function representing a convex preference relation %. Then if
a function f : R→ R is strictly increasing, the composite function f ◦u is another utility representation of
%. However, for a given concave utility function u, one can relatively easily construct a strictly increasing
function f such that f ◦ u is not concave.
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Definition 2 (Preference for diversification). A preference relation % exhibits preference
for diversification if for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] for which
∑n
i=1 αi = 1,
x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn =⇒
n∑
i=1
αixi % xj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
This definition states that an individual will want to diversify among a collection of
choices all of which are ranked equivalently. The most common example of such diversi-
fication is within the universe of asset markets, where an investor faces a choice amongst
risky assets. We recall that this notion of diversification is, in our setup, equivalent to
that of convexity of preferences.
Proposition 2. A monotonic and continuous preference relation % on X is convex if and
only if it exhibits preference for diversification.
Various other definitions of diversification exist in the literature. Chateauneuf and
Tallon (2002) introduce the stronger notion of sure diversification. Roughly, sure diversi-
fication stipulates that if the decision maker is indifferent between a collection of choices
and can attain certainty by a convex combination of these choices, he should prefer that
certain combination to any of the uncertain choices used in the combination.
Definition 3 (Preference for sure diversification). A preference relation % exhibits pref-
erence for sure diversification if for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0 satisfying∑n
i=1 αi = 1, and c, β ∈ R,[
x1 ∼ · · · ∼ xn ∧
n∑
i=1
αixi = βδc
]
=⇒ βδc % xi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007) introduce a weakening of the concept of preference
for diversification, which is referred to as preference for strong diversification. Preference
for strong diversification means that the decision maker will want to diversify between two
choices that are identically distributed.
Definition 4 (Preference for strong diversification). A preference relation % exhibits
preference for strong diversification if for all x, y ∈ X with Fx = Fy and α ∈ [0, 1],
αx+ (1− α)y % y.
Preference for diversification implies preference for sure diversification, but the converse
does not hold. One can also show that preferences for strong diversification are equivalent
to requiring that preferences respect second-order stochastic dominance (see Chateauneuf
and Lakhnati (2007) for an outline of the proof). Moreover, Chateauneuf and Lakhnati
(2007) also provide a counterexample showing that preferences for strong diversification
do not imply convex preferences.
Yet another notion of diversification was introduced by Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002),
namely that of comonotone diversification. Two random variables x, y ∈ X are comono-
tonic if they yield the same ordering of the state space from best to worst; more formally
if for every ω, ω′ ∈ S, (x(ω) − x(ω′))(y(ω) − y(ω′)) ≥ 0. Comonotonic diversification is
defined as follows:
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Definition 5 (Comonotone diversification). A decision maker exhibits preference for
comonotone diversification if for all comonotonic x and y for which x ∼ y,
αx+ (1− α)y % x
for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Comonotone diversification is essentially convexity of preferences restricted to comono-
tonic random variables, just as Schmeidler (1989) restricted independence to comonotonic
acts (see Section 8 for a more detailed discussion of Schmeidler’s model). Under this more
restrictive type of diversification, any hedging in the sense of Wakker (1990) is prohibited.
3.3 Diversification and quasiconvex risk
In mathematical finance, diversification is often understood to be a technique for reducing
overall risk, where, here, one may follow the Knightian (Knight 1921) identification of the
notion of risk as measurable uncertainty. In classical risk assessment within mathematical
finance, uncertain portfolio outcomes over a fixed time horizon are represented as random
variables on a probability space. A risk measure maps each random variable to a real
number summarizing the overall position in risky assets of a portfolio. In his seminal
paper, Markowitz (1952), even though he proposed variance as a risk measure, emphasized
the importance for a risk measure to encourage diversification.2 Over the past two decades,
a number of academic efforts have more formally proposed properties that a risk measure
should satisfy, for example the work of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2010) and Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2011) who echo Markowitz in that a “good” risk measure needs to promote diversification.
The key property is once again that of convexity, which, if satisfied, does not allow the
diversified risk to exceed the individual standalone risks. It thus reflects the key principle
of economics and finance, as well as the key normative statement in the theory of choice,
namely that diversification should not increase risk.
We review this diversification paradigm in the context of risk measures within the
theory of choice. We emulate the formal setup of Drapeau and Kupper (2013), where
the risk perception of choices is modeled via a binary relation %ˆ, the “risk order”, on
X satisfying some appropriate normative properties. A risk order represents a decision
maker’s individual risk perception, where x%ˆy is interpreted as x being less risky than y.
Risk measures are then quasiconvex monotone functions, which play the role of numerical
representation of the risk order.
The two main properties of risk captured by a risk order are those of convexity and
monotonicity. The convexity axiom reflects that diversification across two choices keeps
the overall risk below the worse one; the monotonicity axiom states that the risk order is
compatible with the vector preorder. A formal definition follows.
2“Diversification is both observed and sensible; a rule of behavior which does not imply the superiority
of diversification must be rejected.”
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Definition 6 (Risk order). A risk order on the set X is a reflexive weak preference relation
satisfying the convexity3 and monotonicity axioms.
Numerical representations of risk orders inherit the two key properties of convexity
and monotonicity of a decision maker’s risk perception and are called risk measures.
Definition 7 (Risk measure). A real-valued mapping ρ : X → R is a risk measure if it is:
(i) quasiconvex: for all x, y ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1], ρ(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ max{ρ(x), ρ(y)}
(ii) monotone: for all x, y ∈ X , x ≥ y =⇒ ρ(x) ≤ ρ(y)
The following theorem states the bijective correspondence between risk orders and their
representation via risk measures.
Theorem 1 (Drapeau and Kupper (2013)). Any numerical representation ρ%ˆ : X → R of
a risk order %ˆ on X is a risk measure. Conversely, any risk measure ρ : X → R defines
the risk order %ˆρ on X by
x%ˆρy ⇐⇒ ρ(x) ≤ ρ(y) .
Risk orders and risk measures are bijectively equivalent in the sense that %ˆ = %ˆρ%ˆ and
ρ%ˆρ
= h ◦ ρ for some increasing transformation h : R→ R.
Note that, in the context of theories of choice, the risk measure ρ%ˆ corresponding to a
given risk order %ˆ is in fact the negative of the quasiconcave utility representation of the
convex and monotonic total preorder %ˆ. In our setup of choice amongst risky positions
L∞(Ω,F ,P), a commonly used example of such a risk measure is the tail mean (Acerbi
and Tasche 2002b, Acerbi and Tasche 2002a), defined by TMα = E [x | x > qα(x)], where
α ∈ (0, 1) is the confidence level and qα(x) = inf{x′ ∈ R : P (x ≤ x′) ≥ α} is the lower
α-quantile of the random variable x.4
Based on the previous discussion, a risk order exhibits preference for diversification
(through the equivalent convexity axiom) if and only if the corresponding risk measure
representing it is quasiconvex. This is a weakening of the general understanding of di-
versification within the theory of quantitative risk measurement, where diversification is
encouraged when considering convex risk measures5 (Fo¨llmer and Schied 2010, Fo¨llmer
and Schied 2011) or, even more strongly, subadditive risk measures6 (Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber, and Heath 1999).
3Drapeau and Kupper (2013) refer to the convexity property as quasiconvexity, which we believe is
a mathematically more appropriate nomenclature. However, we stick to the more widely used convexity
terminology for consistency.
4This definition of tail mean holds only under the assumption of continuous distributions, that is for
integrable x.
5A risk measure ρ : X → R is convex if for all x, y ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1], ρ(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λρ(x) + (1−
λ)ρ(y).
6A risk measure ρ : X → R is subadditive if for all x, y ∈ X , ρ(x+ y) ≤ ρ(x) + ρ(y).
9
In mathematical finance, the passage from convexity to quasiconvexity is conceptually
subtle but significant; see, for example, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Mon-
trucchio (2011a). While convexity is generally regarded as the mathematical formalization
of the notion of diversification, it is in fact equivalent to the notion of quasiconvexity un-
der a translation invariance assumption7. By considering the weaker notion of quasiconvex
risk, one disentangles the diversification principle from the assumption of liquidity of the
riskless asset – an abstract simplification encapsulated through the translation invariance
axiom. As we have seen above, the economic counterpart of quasiconvexity of risk measures
is quasiconcavity of utility functions, which is equivalent to convexity of preferences.
4 Notions of risk aversion
The concepts of diversification and risk aversion are closely intertwined. Informally, one
might say that the goal behind introducing variety through diversification is the reduction
of “risk” or “uncertainty”, and so one might identify a diversifying decision maker with a
risk averse one. We will later see that this is generally not the case.
In axiomatic choice theory, risk aversion is roughly the preference for a certain outcome
with a possibly lower expected payoff over an uncertain outcome with equal or higher
expected value. In the economics literature, risk aversion is often exactly captured by the
concavity of the utility function, and this is based on the underlying implicit framework of
expected utility theory. In other models, however, risk aversion no longer goes along with a
concave utility function, unless perhaps the very definition of risk aversion is reconsidered.
In this section, when relating risk aversion to diversification or convexity of preferences,
we look at intrinsic notions of risk aversion rather than model-dependent definitions. To
this end, we use the three most frequently used definitions of weak, strong, and monotone
risk aversion. In expected utility theory, all of these notions coincide and are characterized
by the concavity of the utility function. We stress, however, the model-independency of
the following definitions.
4.1 Weak risk aversion
The first, most common notion of risk aversion is based on the comparison between a
random variable and its expected value. A decision maker is weakly risk averse if he
always prefers the expected value of a random variable with certainty to the random
variable itself.
Definition 8 (Weak risk aversion). The preference relation % on X is weakly risk averse
if δe(x) % x for every x ∈ X , where e(x) denotes the expected value of the random variable
x. A decision maker is weakly risk seeking if he always prefers any random variable to
its expected value with certainty; formally if for all x ∈ X , x % δe(x). A decision maker is
7A risk measure ρ : X → R is tranlsation invariant (or cash-additive) if for all x ∈ X and m ∈ R,
ρ(x+m) = ρ(x)−m.
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weakly risk neutral if he is always indifferent between any random variable and its expected
value with certainty; formally if for all x ∈ X , x ∼ δe(x).
A straightforward characterization of weak risk aversion can be given in terms of the
risk premium. Indeed, a decision maker is weakly risk averse if and only if the risk premium
pi(x) associated to any x ∈ X is always nonnegative. Using this, one obtains a relation
between decision makers ranking their level of risk aversion. Decision maker D1 is said
to be more risk averse than decision maker D2 if and only if for every x ∈ X , the risk
premium pi(x) associated to x is at least as great for D1 as it is for D2.
4.2 Strong risk aversion
The second notion of risk aversion is based on the definition of increasing risk of Hadar and
Russell (1969) and Rothchild and Stiglitz (1970) (see also Landsberger and Meilijson 1993)
who define it in terms of the mean preserving spread.
Definition 9 (Mean preserving spread). For two random variables x, y ∈ X , y is a
mean preserving spread of x if and only if e(x) = e(y) and x second-order stochastically
dominates y, written as x %SSD y, that is if for any C ∈ R,∫ C
−∞
Fx(c)dc ≤
∫ C
−∞
Fy(c)dc.
The mean preserving spread is intuitively a change from one probability distribution to
another probability distribution, where the latter is formed by spreading out one or more
portions of the probability density function or probability mass function of the former
distribution while leaving the expected value unchanged. As such, the concept of mean
preserving spreads provides a stochastic ordering of equal-mean choices according to their
degree of risk. From the definition, we see that ordering choices by mean preserving
spreads is a special case of ordering them by second-order stochastic dominance when the
expected values coincide. Moreover, this ordering has the following properties.
Lemma 1. The stochastic ordering induced by the mean preserving spread on x, y ∈ X (i)
depends only on the probability distributions of x and y; and (ii) implies a non-decreasing
variance, but a non-decreasing variance does not imply a mean preserving spread.
The notion of strong risk aversion can be viewed as aversion to any increase in risk,
formalized next in terms of the mean preserving spread.
Definition 10 (Strong risk aversion). The preference relation % is strongly risk averse
if and only if for any x, y ∈ X such that y is a mean preserving spread of x, x % y. It
is strongly risk seeking if for any x, y ∈ X such that y is a mean-preserving spread of x,
y % x. The preference relation % is strongly risk neutral if for any x, y ∈ X such that y
is a mean-preserving spread of x, x ∼ y.
Preferences that are strongly risk averse (respectively strongly risk seeking) are also
weakly risk averse (respectively weakly risk seeking). This is because for any x ∈ X , x is
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always a mean preserving spread of δe(x). Note also that strong and weak risk neutrality
are equivalent, because weak risk neutrality implies that any x is indifferent to δe(x) so
that if y is a mean preserving spread of x, they are both indifferent to δe(x).
4.3 Monotone risk aversion
The notion of strong risk aversion can be considered as too strong by some decision makers.
This lead Quiggin (1992) (see also Quiggin (1991)) to define a new way for measuring
increasing risk and, as a consequence, a new weaker notion of risk aversion, called monotone
risk aversion.
The definition of monotone risk aversion involves comonotonic random variables. Recall
that two random variables x, y ∈ X are comonotonic if they yield the same ordering of the
state space from best to worst. Clearly, every constant random variable is comonotonic
with every other random variable. One can then define a measure of increasing risk of
comonotonic random variables as follows.
Definition 11 (Mean preserving monotone spread I). Suppose x and y are two comono-
tonic random variables. Then y is a mean preserving monotone spread of x if e(x) = e(y)
and z = y − x is comonotonic with x and y.
This definition ensures that, since x and z are comonotonic, there is no hedging between
x and z, and thus that y can be viewed as more risky than x. It can be extended to random
variables that are not necessarily comonotonic, as follows.
Definition 12 (Mean preserving monotone spread II). For two random variables x, y ∈ X ,
y is a mean preserving monotone spread of x if there exists a random variable θ ∈ X such
that y has the same probability distribution as x + θ, where e(θ) = 0 and x and θ are
comonotonic.
The notion of monotone risk aversion can be viewed as aversion to monotone increasing
risk and is based on the definition of mean preserving monotone spread. We will later show
that this concept of risk aversion is consistent with the rank-dependent expected utility
theory of Quiggin (1982), one of the most well-known generalizations of expected utility
theory, in which comonotonicity plays a fundamental part at the axiomatic level.
Definition 13 (Monotone risk aversion). The preference relation % on X is monotone
risk averse if for any x, y ∈ X where y is a mean preserving monotone spread of x, x % y.
It is monotone risk seeking if for any x, y ∈ X where y is a mean preserving monotone
spread of x, y % x, and it is monotone risk neutral if for any x, y ∈ X where y is a mean
preserving monotone spread of x, x ∼ y.
Finally, the following relationship between the three notions of weak, strong, and mono-
tone risk aversion holds.
Proposition 3 (Cohen (1995)). Strong risk aversion implies monotone risk aversion;
monotone risk aversion implies weak risk aversion; weak risk neutrality, strong risk neu-
trality, and monotone risk neutrality are identical.
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5 Model-independent diversification preferences
We study the relationship between diversification preferences, convex preferences and risk
aversion when preferences are not assumed to fit a specific choice theoretic model. As
before, we simply assume that preferences are monotonic and continuous.
5.1 Weak risk aversion and diversification
Because the conventional definition of diversification is too strong to yield an equivalence
to weak risk aversion when we move outside the assumptions of expected utility theory, the
weaker concept of sure diversification was introduced. This weaker notion of diversification
is indeed equivalent to weak risk aversion, independent of any model.
Proposition 4 (Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007)). A monotonic and compact contin-
uous8 preference relation % exhibits preference for sure diversification if and only if it is
weakly risk averse.
5.2 Strong risk aversion and diversification
In the space of probability distributions rather than random variables, Dekel (1989)9 shows
that – assuming no particular choice model – preference for diversification is usually
stronger that strong risk aversion. Indeed, he shows that preference for diversification
implies risk aversion, but the converse is false.
Proposition 5 (Dekel (1989)). A strongly risk averse preference relation % does not
necessarily exhibit preference for diversification.
This means that preference for diversification is generally stronger than strong risk
aversion. However, a complete characterization of strong risk aversion can be achieved
through a weakening of preference for diversification obtained through the notion of strong
diversification.
Theorem 2 (Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007)). A monotonic and compact continuous
preference relation % exhibits preference for strong diversification if and only if it respects
second-order stochastic dominance.
An immediate consequence of this result is that convexity of preferences, or equivalently
preference for diversification, implies strong risk aversion. We point out that Dekel (1989)
proves the same result in the framework of probability distributions.
Corollary 1. A preference relation % exhibiting preference for diversification is strongly
risk averse.
8A preference relation % is compact continuous if x % y whenever a bounded sequence (xn)n∈N con-
verges in distribution to x and xn % y for each n. As noted by Chew and Mao (1995), many widely
used examples of expected utility preferences are in fact compact continuous and not continuous when
the corresponding utility function is discontinuous or unbounded.
9The theoretical setup of Dekel (1989) used to derive the results reviewed in this section is a very
particular one, and we encourage the reader to read his article for the details.
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6 Choice under risk I: expected utility theory
Since the publication of the seminal Theory of Games and Economic Behavior of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), expected utility theory (EUT) has dominated the
analysis of decision-making under risk and has generally been accepted as a normative
model of rational choice.10 A wide range of economic phenomena that previously lay
beyond the scope of economic formalization were successfully modelled under expected
utility theory.
This Section illustrates that, in the axiomatic setup of expected utility theory, (i) all
notions of risk aversion coincide with concavity of utility, (ii) all notions of diversifica-
tion coincide, and (iii) preference for diversification (that is convexity of preferences) is
equivalent to risk aversion.
6.1 Von Neumann–Morgenstern representation
A utility representation of the preference relation % on X under EUT takes the form
u(x) =
∫
u(c) dFx(c), x ∈ X , c ∈ R, u : R→ R.
Traditionally, the objects of choice in the von Neumann–Morgenstern setup are lotteries
rather than random variables, which are formalized via probability distributions. The
agent’s choice set is hence the set M of all probability measures on a separable metric
space (S,B), with B the σ-field of Borel sets. A utility representation u of a preference
relation % on M takes the form
u(µ) =
∫
u(x)µ(dx), µ ∈M, u : S → R.
A compound lottery that is represented by the distribution αµ + (1 − α)ν ∈ M, for
α ∈ [0, 1], gives µ with probability α and ν with probability (1−α), and so the probability
of an outcome x under the compound lottery is given by
(αµ+ (1− α)ν) (x) = αµ(x) + (1− α)ν(x).
The crucial additional axiom that identifies expected utility theory is the independence
axiom. It has also proven to be the most controversial. The independence axiom states
that, when comparing the two compound lotteries αµ + (1 − α)ξ and αν + (1 − α)ξ,
the decision maker should focus on the distinction between µ and ν and hold the same
preference independently of both α and ξ. The key idea is that substituting ξ for part of
µ and part of ν should not change the initial preference ranking. The formal statement of
the axiom follows.
10This is despite the evidence supporting alternative descriptive models showing that people’s actual
behavior deviates significantly from this normative model. See Stanovich (2009) and Hastie and Dawes
(2009) for a discussion.
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Independence: For all µ, ν, ξ ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1], µ % ν =⇒ αµ + (1 − α)ξ %
αν + (1− α)ξ.
Remark 1. In this paper we adopted the classical setup in mathematical finance, which
is the space of random variables. However, as mentioned above, the von Neumann–
Morgenstern setup is the space of lotteries. In view of our discussion on preference for
diversification, we refer to Dekel (1989, Proposition 3), which states that convexity of
preferences over the space of lotteries together with risk aversion implies preference for
diversification over the space of random variables. This clarifies the link between convexity
of preferences over the space of lotteries and convexity of preferences over the space of
random variables.
6.2 Risk aversion in EUT
The power of the analysis of concepts of risk aversion and of the corresponding interpre-
tation of increasing risk in terms of stochastic dominance contributed to a large degree to
the success of EUT in studying problems relating to risk. Indeed, in EUT, risk aversion
corresponds to a simple condition on the utility function: within the class of preference
relations which admit a von-Neumann-Morgenstern representation, a decision maker is
characterized via his concave utility function.
Proposition 6. Suppose the preference relation % satisfies expected utility theory and
admits a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation u. Then: (i) % is weakly risk
averse if and only if u is concave; and (ii) % is strongly risk averse if and only if u is
concave.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 6 and Proposition 3 is that, under the ex-
pected utility framework, all three notions of weak, strong, and monotone risk aversion
coincide.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of expected utility theory, the definitions of weak,
strong, and monotone risk aversion are equivalent.
In its essence, expected utility theory imposes restrictions on choice patterns. Indeed, it
is impossible to be weakly risk averse without being strongly risk averse. As a consequence,
in EUT one simply speaks of “risk aversion” without any need to specify the particular
notion. Because it is characterized by concavity of utility, one can characterize the level of
risk aversion through the curvature of the utility function. We recall the most commonly
used such measure of risk aversion, introduced by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), and its
characterization in the expected utility model.
Definition 14 (Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion). For an expected utility theory
decision maker with utility function u, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion
is defined for any outcome c ∈ R by
A(c) = −u
′′(c)
u′(c)
.
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Proposition 7. Suppose that u1 and u2 are two strictly increasing and twice continuously
differentiable functions on R representing expected utility preferences with corresponding
Arrow-Pratt coefficients A1 and A2 and risk premiums pi1 and pi2, respectively. Then
the following conditions are equivalent: (i) A1(c) ≥ A2(c) for all outcomes c ∈ R; (ii)
u1 = g ◦ u2 for some strictly increasing concave function g; (iii) pi1(x) ≥ pi2(x) for all
x ∈ X .
This essentially characterizes the relation of being more risk averse through the Arrow-
Pratt coefficient.
6.3 Diversification preferences in EUT
Under the assumptions of expected utility theory, the two forms of sure and comonotone
diversification are both represented by concavity of the utility index and consequently
cannot be distinguished. Furthermore, they cannot be distinguished from the traditional
notion of diversification, which corresponds to convexity of preferences.
Proposition 8 (Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)). Suppose % is a preference relation in
the expected utility theory framework with utility index u. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) % exhibits preference for diversification
(ii) % exhibits preference for sure diversification
(iii) % exhibits preference for comonotone diversification
(iv) u is concave
Moreover, recall that the equivalence between diversification and risk aversion estab-
lished in the expected utility framework does not hold in more general frameworks. In
particular, the notion of strong diversification, that is preference for diversification among
two identically distributed assets, was shown to be equivalent to strong risk aversion. Un-
der the assumptions of EUT, this simply means that strong diversification coincides with
all forms of risk aversion and, therefore, with concavity of utility.
Corollary 3. Suppose % is a preference relation in the expected utility theory framework
with utility index u. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) % exhibits preference for strong diversification
(ii) % is risk averse
(iii) u is concave
In summary, all notions of risk aversion (weak, strong, monotone) and of diversification
(sure, strong, comonotone, and convex preferences) introduced in this article coincide with
concavity of utility in the framework of expected utility theory.
As an illustration of a concrete portfolio choice implication of this correspondence,
consider the problem of investing in one risk-free asset with return r and one risky asset
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paying a random return z. Under a full investment assumption, suppose the decision
maker invests w in the risky asset and the remaining 1− w in the safe asset, implying an
overall portfolio return of wz + (1− w)r. Maximizing utility u formally means
max
w
∫
u(wz + (1− w)r)dF (z) ,
where F is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the risky asset. An investor who is
risk neutral will only care about the expected return, and hence will put all of the available
wealth into the asset with the highest expected return. If the investor is risk averse, the
utility is concave, and hence the second order condition of the maximization problem
completely characterizes the solution. More importantly, this means that if the risky asset
has a postitve rate of return above the risk-free rate (that is z > r), the risk averse investor
will still choose to invest some amount w > 0 in the risky asset. In summary, under the
diversification preferences of expected utility maximizers, all risk averse decision makers
will still want to take on some amount of risk at positive returns.
In his so-called local risk-neutrality theorem, Arrow (1965) formally derives the ex-
pected utility portfolio choice pattern. Indeed, an economic agent who must allocate
wealth between a safe and a risky asset will invest in an asset if and only if the expected
value of the asset exceeds the price. The amount of the asset bought depends on the
agent’s attitude towards risk. Conversely, if the expected value is lower than the price of
the asset, the agent will want to sell the asset short. Consequently, an investor’s demand
for an asset should be positive below a certain price, negative above that same price, and
zero at exactly that price. In case there are many risky assets, this price will not nec-
essarily be the expected value. Arrow’s result holds in the absence of transaction costs
whenever it is possible to buy small quantities of an asset.
Analyzing how changes in risk preferences affect optimal portfolio choice, one can use
the comparative risk aversion measure of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) to show the
following intuitive result. If an expected utility investor with utility u is more risk-averse
than a second expected utility investor with utility v, then in the portfolio choice problem,
the former investor will optimally invest less in the risky asset than the latter for any initial
level of wealth. However, Ross (1981) has pointed out that this result depends crucially
on the fact that the less risky asset has a certain return. If both assets are risky, with one
less risky than the other, a much stronger condition is needed to guarantee that the less
risk averse investor will invest more in the riskier asset than the more risk averse investor
for equal levels of wealth.
7 Choice under risk II: rank-dependent expected util-
ity theory
Rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEU) is a generalization of expected utility
theory accommodating the observation that economic agents both purchase lottery tickets
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(implying risk-seeking preferences) and insure against losses (implying risk aversion). In
particular, RDEU explains the behaviour observed in the Allais paradox by weakening the
independence axiom. RDEU was first axiomatized by Quiggin (1982) as anticipated utility
theory, and was further studied by Yaari (1987), Segal (1989), Allais (1987), and Wakker
(1990), amongst others.
After reviewing the basics of RDEU, we show that the equivalence between weak and
strong risk aversion does not carry over from the expected utility model; see Machina
(1982) and Machina (2008). Similarly, the correspondence of preference for diversification
and risk aversion fails in the RDEU framework.
7.1 Overview of RDEU
The development of rank-dependent expected utility theory was motivated by the idea that
equally probable events should not necessarily receive the same decision weights. Such a
probability weighting scheme is meant to incorporate the apparent feature of overweighting
of low probability events with extreme consequences that has been observed in violations
of EUT models.
The RDEU model has a simple formalization in which outcomes are transformed by a
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and probabilities are transformed by a weight-
ing function. The utility function being the same as in EUT implies that standard tools
of analysis developed for EUT may be applied, with some modifications, to the RDEU
framework. The probability weighting scheme first arranges states of the world so that the
outcomes they yield are ordered from worst to best, then gives each state a weight that
depends on its ranking as well as its probability. These ideas are formalized as follows.
Definition 15 (Preferences under rank-dependent expected utility theory). A decision
maker satisfies rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory if and only if his preference
relation % can be represented by a real-valued function V such that for every x, y ∈ X ,
x % y ⇐⇒ Vf,u(x) ≥ Vf,u(y)
where Vf,u is defined for every z ∈ X by
Vf,u(z) =
∫ 0
−∞
(f(P [u(z) > t])− 1) dt+
∫ ∞
0
f (P [u(z) > t]) dt ,
where u : R→ R, the utility function representing %, is assumed to be continuous, strictly
increasing and unique up to positive affine transformations, and f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a
unique, continuous and strictly increasing function satisfying f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1.
When X has a finite number of outcomes x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn, this representation
reduces to
Vf,u(z) = u(x1) +
n∑
i=2
f
(
n∑
j=i
pj
)
(u(xi)− u(xi−1)) .
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Preferences under RDEU are therefore characterized by the functions u and f ; the
utility function u is interpreted as the utility level under certainty, and the transformation
function f is interpreted as the perception of probabilities.
Note that in the case that f(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1], RDEU reduces to expected utility
theory. Consider on the other hand the case f(p) ≤ p, which means that the decison
maker’s perception of probability is less than the actual probability. For finite X , this
condition implies that the decision maker, having at least utility u(x1), systematically
underweights the additional utilities u(xi)− u(xi−1). Such a decision maker is referred to
as being (weakly) pessimistic.
Definition 16. A RDEU preference relation % is weakly pessimistic if and only if f(p) ≤
p for all p ∈ [0, 1], and weakly optimistic if and only if f(p) ≥ p for all p ∈ [0, 1].
7.2 Risk aversion in RDEU
RDEU models suggest an approach to risk aversion that differs from EUT. By definition,
RDEU theory can be viewed as embodying a fundamental distinction between attitudes
to outcomes and attitudes to probabilities. Risk aversion within the RDEU framework
should then encompass two different phenomena. The first is the standard notion of
risk aversion within EUT associated with preferences over outcomes in terms of declining
utility of wealth. The second relates to preferences over probabilities, that is to the
transformation function f . We next review characterizations of both the utility function u
and the probability weighting function f in terms of the various notions of risk aversion.11
We begin with weak risk aversion. Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) give necessary and
sufficient conditions under which preferences are weakly risk averse. We only mention one
particular case in which their conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
Proposition 9 (Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994)). A RDEU decision maker whose utility
function u is concave and differentiable is weakly risk averse if and only if he is weakly
pessimistic.
Strong risk aversion in rank-dependent utility theory has been characterized by Chew,
Karni, and Safra (1987) as follows.
Proposition 10 (Chew, Karni, and Safra (1987)). A RDEU preference relation % is
strongly risk averse if and only if its utility u is concave and probability weighting f is
convex.
This is a rather strong characterization, since under RDEU, a decision maker cannot
be strongly risk averse without having concave utility. On the other hand, under the dual
theory of Yaari (1987), strong risk aversion corresponds to the convexity of f (see Yaari
(1987)).
11For a more complete review of the notions of risk aversion within the theory of choice under risk, we
refer the reader to Cohen (1995).
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Finally, monotone risk aversion under the RDEU framework has been characterized by
Quiggin (1992).
Proposition 11 (Quiggin (1992)). (i) A RDEU decision maker who is monotone risk
averse and whose utility u is concave is weakly pessimistic. (ii) A RDEU decision maker
who is weakly pessimistic and has concave utility u is monotone risk averse.
Moreover, one obtains a characterization of the mean-preserving monotone spread.
Proposition 12 (Quiggin (1992)). For x, y ∈ X for which e(x) = e(y), y is a monotone
mean-preserving spread of x if and only if for the preference relation % under RDEU,
x % y.
7.3 Diversification preferences in RDEU
In expected utility theory, risk averse decision makers will always prefer a diversified
portfolio over a concentrated one. A similar result holds for RDEU decision makers who
are strongly risk averse in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 13 (Quiggin (1993)). A RDEU decision maker exhibits preference for di-
versification if and only if he is strongly risk averse, that is if and only if the utility u is
concave and probability weighting f is convex.
The weaker notion of sure diversification, where the decision maker prefers diversifica-
tion if he can attain certainty by a convex combination of choices (in addition to being
indifferent between these choices), is actually equivalent to that of weak risk aversion in
the RDEU framework.
Proposition 14 (Chateauneuf and Lakhnati (2007)). A RDEU decision maker exhibits
preference for sure diversification if and only if he is weakly risk averse.
Assuming additionally concavity (and differentiability of utility), we can immediately
relate sure diversification and the notion of weak pessimism under RDEU as follows.
Corollary 4. A RDEU decision maker with differentiable and concave utility u exhibits
preference for sure diversification if and only if he is weakly pessimistic.
Finally, consider the case of comonotonic random variables and the associated notion
of comonotone diversification, which essentially restricts preference for diversification to
comonotonic choices. Given comonotonic random variables, one can show that a RDEU
decision maker will in fact be indifferent regarding diversification across such comonotonic
prospects. This was proven by Ro¨ell (1987).
Remark 2 (Convexity of preferences in RDEU). Quiggin (1993) discusses the relation-
ship between diversification as a linear mixture of random variables and the concepts of
convexity and concavity of preferences. Recall that we identify convex preferences with the
traditional definition of diversification. However, in RDEU theory, where preference for
diversification over outcome mixtures arises without convexity, this analogy is misleading,
even though the correspondence between strong risk aversion and diversification carries
over to this model. We refer the reader to Quiggin (1993) for a detailed discussion and
further references on this topic.
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Remark 3 (Implications on portfolio choice). Rank-dependent expected utility contains the
following two components: a concave utility function and a reversed S-shaped probability
distortion function. The first component captures the observation that individuals dislike
a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of a random outcome. The second component
captures the tendency to overweight tail events — a principle that can explain why people
buy both insurance and lotteries. Indeed, Quiggin (1991) points out that the behavior of an
individual whose preferences are described by a RDEU functional with a concave outcome
utility function and a (reversed) S-shaped probability weighting function will display risk
aversion except when confronted with probability distributions that are skewed to the right.12
8 Choice under uncertainty
Models of choice under risk were originally formulated to be used with pre-specified or
objective probabilities. One of their main limitations is that uncertainty is treated as
objective risk. Not all uncertainty, however, can be described by such an objective prob-
ability. Following the fundamental works of Keynes (1921), Knight (1921), and Ramsey
(1926), we now draw a distinction between uncertainty and risk — risk is used when the
gamble in question has objectively agreed upon known odds, while uncertainty roughly
refers to situations where the odds are unknown.13
Notions of diversification and uncertainty aversion, rather than risk aversion, are hence
discussed within models of expected utility under a (not necessarily additive) subjective
probabilty measure, which seeks to distinguish between quantifiable risks and unknown
uncertainty. Such choice theoretic models originated with the seminal works of Savage
(1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Our framework will be the axiomatic treat-
ment of such models as developed by Schmeidler (1989); see also Gilboa (1987). These
axiomatizations involve the use of the Choquet integral to derive the corresponding rep-
resentation results for nonadditive probabilities — we will hence refer to such models of
uncertainty as Choquet expected utility (CEU) models.
8.1 Choquet expected utility theory
Before formally setting up the axiomatic framework of Schmeidler (1989), we quickly
review the basics of subjective expected utility theory under additive and nonadditive
probability measures. In this subsection we depart from the theoretical setting of Section 2
and adopt the classical decisional theoretical setup where decision makers choose from a
set of acts.
12A number of papers have studied portfolio theory, risk-sharing and insurance contracting in the RDEU
framework; see Bernard, He, Yan, and Zhou (2013) for a detailed review.
13Objective risk is typically available in games of chance, such as a series of coin flips where the proba-
bilities are objectively known. In practice, the notion of risk also encompasses situations, in which reliable
statistical information is available, and from which objective probabilities are inferred. Uncertainty, on
the other hand, can arise in practice from situations of complete ignorance or when insufficient statistical
data is available, for example.
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8.1.1 Subjective expected utility
In the standard model of (subjective) uncertainty pioneered by Savage (1954), the decision
maker chooses from a set of acts. The formal model consists of a set of prizes or conse-
quences X = R and a state space S endowed with an algebra Σ. The set of acts A is the
set of all finite measurable functions (the inverse of each interval is an element of Σ from
Ω to R). Preference relations % are defined over acts in A. A subjective expected utility
representation of % is given by a subjective probability measure P on the states S and a
utility function u : X → R on the consequences X satisfying
f % g ⇐⇒
∫
S
u (f(s)) dP ≥
∫
S
u (g(s)) dP.
The expectation operation here is carried out with respect to a prior probability de-
rived uniquely from the decision maker’s preferences over acts. Both Savage (1954) and
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) provide axiomatizations of preferences leading to the cri-
terion of maximization of subjective expected utility, making this representation hold, the
latter being the simpler development, since a special structure is imposed on the set X of
consequences. The classic development of Savage (1954) is more general yet more complex,
a thorough review of which is beyond the scope of the present article. We do, however,
briefly mention one key axiom of Savage’s, known as the Sure-Thing Principle.
Axiom 1 (Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle). Suppose f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ A are four acts and T ⊆ S
is a subset of the state space such that f(s) = f ′(s) and g(s) = g′(s) for all s ∈ T , and
f(s) = g(s) and f ′(s) = g′(s) for all s ∈ TC. Then f % g if and only if f ′ % g′.
This axiom can be interpreted in terms of preferences being separable — if the decision
maker prefers act f to act g for all possible states in TC (for example knowing a certain
event will happen), and act f is still preferred to act g for all states in T (for example
if that certain event does not happen), then the decision maker should prefer act f to
act g independent of the state. Using the example of an event occurring, this means
that f is preferred to g despite having no knowledge of whether or not that certain event
will happen. The axiom essentially states that outcomes which occur regardless of which
actions are chosen, “sure things”, should not affect one’s preferences.
8.1.2 Schmeidler’s axiomatization of subjective expected utility under non-
additive probabilities
Schmeidler’s axiomatization of choice under uncertainty without additivity formally sepa-
rates the notion of individual perception of uncertainty from valuation of outcomes. Under
the key axiom of comonotonic independence, preferences under uncertainty are character-
ized by means of a functional that turns out to be a Choquet integral.
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Ellsberg’s paradox14 (Ellsberg 1961) was the main reason motivating the development
of a more general theory of subjective probabilities, in which the probabilities need not be
additive.
Definition 17 (Nonadditive probability measure). A real-valued set function v : Σ →
[0, 1] on an algebra Σ of subsets of a set of states S is a nonadditive probability measure
if it satisfies the normalization conditions v(∅) = 0 and v(S) = 1, and the monotonicity
condition, that is for all A,B ∈ Σ, if A ⊆ B, then v(A) ≤ v(B).
We now formally set up Schmeidler’s CEU model. The state space S is endowed with
an algebra Σ of subsets of Ω. The set of consequences is assumed to be the positive real
line, i.e., X = R+. The set of acts is the set of L nonnegative measurable functions on
S. Preferences % of the CEU decision maker are defined over the set of acts L and are
assumed to be monotonic and continuous. In order to weaken the independence axiom, the
notion of comonotonic independence was introduced by Schmeidler (1989). Very roughly,
it requires that the usual independence axiom holds only when hedging effects (in the
sense of Wakker (1990)) are absent:
Axiom 2 (Comonotonic Independence). For all pairwise comonotonic acts15 f, g, h ∈ L
and for all α ∈ (0, 1), f % g implies α f + (1− α)h % α g + (1− α)h.
A nonadditive probability measure is referred to as a capacity v : Σ → [0, 1], and we
assume throughout that there exists A ∈ Σ such that v(A) ∈ (0, 1). The core of a capacity
v is defined by
core(v) = {pi : Σ→ R+ | ∀A ∈ Σ, pi(A) ≥ v(A); pi(S) = 1} .
Schmeidler (1989) proved that the preference relation % on L satisfying comonotonic
independence (and the usual monotonicity and continuity axioms) is represented through
a Choquet integral with respect to a unique capacity v rather than a unique additive
probability measure.
Definition 18 (Choquet integral). The Choquet integral (Choquet (1954)) of a real-valued
function u : L→ R on a set of states S with respect to a capacity v is defined by∫
u(f(·)) dv =
∫ 0
−∞
(v(u(f) ≥ t)− 1) dt+
∫ ∞
0
v(u(f) ≥ t) dt .
Note that if the capacity v is in fact an additive probability measure p, then the
Choquet integral reduces to the mathematical expectation with respect to p.
14Ellsberg (1961) proposed experiments where choices violate the postulates of subjective expected util-
ity, more specifically the Sure-Thing Principle. The basic idea is that a decision maker will always choose
a known probability of winning over an unknown probability of winning even if the known probability is
low and the unknown probability could be a guarantee of winning. His paradox holds independent of the
utility function and risk aversion characteristics of the decision maker, and implies a notion of uncertainty
aversion, which is an attitude of preference for known risks over unknown risks.
15Recall that two acts f, g ∈ L are said to be comonotonic if for no s, t ∈ S, f(s) > f(t) and g(s) < g(t).
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Theorem 3 (Schmeidler’s Representation Theorem (Schmeidler (1989))). Suppose that
the preference relation % on L satisfies the comonotonic independence, continuity, and
monotonicity axioms. Then there exists a unique capacity v on Σ and an affine utility-on-
wealth function u : R→ R such that for all f, g ∈ L,
f % g ⇐⇒
∫
S
u(f(·)) dv ≥
∫
S
u(g(·)) dv .
Conversely, if there exist u and v as above with u nonconstant, then the preference relation
% they induce on L satisfies the comonotonic independence, continuity, and monotonicity
axioms. Finally, the function u is unique up to positive linear transformations.
We say that a function V : L → R represents the preference relation % if for all acts
f, g ∈ L, f % g ⇐⇒ V (f) ≥ V (g), where, under the axiomatization of CEU, V (f) for
f ∈ L, is given by the Choquet integral ∫
S
u(f(·)) dv, where u and v satisfy the properties
of the previous Theorem.
8.2 Diversification preferences under uncertainty
In the Choquet expected utility framework, preference for diversification is equivalent
to the utility index being concave and capacity being convex. The following Theorem
provides this characterization:
Theorem 4 (Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)). Assume that u : R+ → R is continuous,
differentiable on R++ and strictly increasing, and let V be the functional representing the
preference relation % under the CEU model. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) % exhibits preference for diversification.
(ii) V is concave.
(iii) u is concave and v is convex.
Recall that the weaker notion of sure diversification introduced by Chateauneuf and
Tallon (2002) can be interpreted as an axiom of uncertainty aversion at large; if the
decision maker can attain certainty by a convex combination of equally desirable random
variables, then he prefers certainty to any of these random variables. Sure diversification
hence embodies a notion of aversion to ambiguity (in the sense of imprecise probability)
as well as a notion of aversion to risk.
In the context of Choquet expected utility, sure diversification does not have a full
characterization in terms of the utility index u and capacity v, as the following Theorem
states.
Theorem 5 (Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)). Let v be the capacity functional in the Cho-
quet expected utility framework, and suppose that the utility index u is continuous, strictly
increasing and differentiable on R++. If the preference relation % exhibits preference for
sure diversification, then core(v) 6= ∅. On the other hand, if core(v) 6= ∅ and u is concave,
then % exhibits preference for sure diversification.
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Characterization of sure diversification under CEU is hence incomplete — a decision
maker with a non-concave utility index may or may not be a sure diversifier. In particular,
Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) give an example for a convex utility index and a capacity
with an empty core which does not yield preference for sure diversification.16 However,
the concavity of the utility index can be shown to be equivalent to a different form of
diversification, namely that of comonotone diversification, which is a restriction of convex-
ity of preferences to comonotone random variables. Indeed, comonotone diversification is
characterized completely by the concavity of the utility index in the CEU framework:
Theorem 6 (Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)). Let v be the capacity functional in the
Choquet expected utility framework, and suppose that the utility index u is continuous,
strictly increasing and differentiable on R++. Then the preference relation % exhibits
preference for comonotone diversification if and only if u is concave.
Corollary 5 (Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002)). Let v be the capacity functional in the
Choquet expected utility framework, and suppose that the utility index u is continuous,
strictly increasing and differentiable on R++. Then the preference relation % exhibits
preference for comonotone and sure diversification if and only if u is concave and core(v)
is non-empty.
8.3 Uncertainty averse preferences based on convexity
Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011b) provide a characteriza-
tion for a general class of preferences that are complete, transitive, convex and monotone,
which they refer to as uncertainty averse preferences. They establish a representation for
uncertainty averse preferences in an Anscombe-Aumann setting which is general yet rich
in structure.17
Let F be the set of all uncertain acts f : S → X, where S is the state space and
X is a convex outcome space, and let ∆ be the set of all probability measures on S.
Cerreira-Vioglio et al. show that a preference relation % is uncertainty averse (and satisfies
additional technical conditions) if and only if there is a utility index u : X → R and a
quasi-convex function G : u(X)×∆→ (−∞,∞], increasing in the first variable, such that
the preference functional
V (f) = min
p∈∆
G
(∫
u(f)dp, p
)
, ∀f ∈ F
represents %, where both u and G are essentially unique.
In their representation, decision makers consider all possible probabilities p and the
associated expected utilities u(f)dp of act f . They then summarize all these evaluations
16See Example 1 in Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002).
17Uncertainty averse preferences are a general class of preferences. Special cases that can be obtained
by suitably specifying the uncertainty aversion index G defined below include, amongst others, varia-
tional preferences and smooth ambiguity preferences. See Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Montrucchio (2011b) for more details.
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by taking their minimum. The function G can be interpreted as an index of uncertainty
aversion; higher degrees of uncertainty aversion correspond to pointwise smaller indices G.
It is shown that the quasiconvexity of G and the cautious attitude reflected by the
minimum derive from the convexity of preferences. Uncertainty aversion is hence closely
related to convexity of preferences. Under the formalization of Cerreiro-Vioglio et al.,
convexity reflects a basic negative attitude of decision makers towards the presence of
uncertainty in their choices.
9 Ambiguity aversion
In the theory of choice under risk, the notion of risk aversion comes from a situation where
a probability can be assigned to each possible outcome of a situation. In models of choice
under uncertainty, however, probabilities of outcomes are unknown, and thus the idea of
a decision maker being risk averse makes little sense when such risks cannot be quantified
objectively. Under uncertainty, the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion roughly captures
the preference for known risks over unknown risks. Whereas risk aversion is defined by
the preference between a risky alternative and its expected value, an ambiguity averse
individual would rather choose an alternative where the probability distribution of the
outcomes is known over one where the probabilities are unknown.
The use of the term ambiguity to describe a particular type of uncertainty is due to
Daniel Ellsberg (Ellsberg 1961).18 As his primary examples, Ellsberg offered two experi-
mental decision problems, which continue to be the primary motivating factors of research
on ambiguity aversion.19 Unlike the economic concept of risk aversion, but similar to the
notion of diversification, there is not unanimous agreement on what ambiguity aversion,
also often referred to as uncertainty aversion, formally is. However several models and
definitions have been proposed. We recall the most prominent such definitions and link
them to the notion of diversification and discuss the implication of ambiguity aversion on
portfolio choice.
9.1 Schmeidler’s uncertainty aversion
Schmeidler (1989) introduced a similar notion of aversion towards the unknown and called
it uncertainty aversion. Uncertainty aversion roughly describes an attitude of preference
for known risks over unknown risks. Formally, it is defined through convexity of prefer-
ences:
Definition 19 (Schmeidler’s uncertainty aversion). A preference relation % on L is said
18“The nature of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events... a quality depending on
the amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of ‘confidence’
in an estimation of relative likelihoods.” (Ellsberg 1961)
19They are referred to as the Two-Urn Paradox and the Three-Color Paradox – see Ellsberg (1961).
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to exhibit uncertainty aversion if for any two acts f, g ∈ L and any α ∈ [0, 1], we have
f % g =⇒ α f + (1− α) g % g .
To present an intuition for this definition, Schmeidler (1989) explains that uncertainty
aversion encapsulates the idea that “smoothing or averaging utility distributions makes
the decision maker better off.” This quote once again represents the general notion of
diversification as discussed throughout this paper, namely that “if f and g are preferred
to h, so is any convex mixture λf + (1− λ)g with λ ∈ (0, 1).”
Recall that in expected utility theory, risk aversion, convexity of preferences, and con-
cavity of utility representations all coincide. On the other hand, in Choquet expected
utility models, convexity of preferences, that is aversion towards uncertainty, can be shown
to be equivalent to convexity of capacity.
Theorem 7 (Schmeidler (1989)). A preference relation % exhibits uncertainty aversion if
and only if the capacity v is convex.
The uncertainty aversion notion of Schmeidler (1989) represents the first attempt to
formalize the notion that individuals dislike ambiguity. The intuition is that, by mixing
two acts, the individual may be able to hedge against variation in utilities, much like, by
forming a portfolio consisting of two or more assets, one can hedge against variation in
monetary payoffs.
Remark 4 (Alternative notions of ambiguity aversion). Other attempts to characterize a
dislike for ambiguity have been proposed in the literature. Epstein (1999) proposed an al-
ternative definition of uncertainty aversion that is more suited to applications in a Savage
domain. His motivation is the weak connection between convexity of capacity and behavior
that is intuitively uncertainty averse (see Epstein (1999) and Zhang (2002) for examples).
Yet another approach was proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). They consider
both the Savage setting, with acts mapping to prizes, and the horse-roulette act framework,
with acts mapping to objective probability distributions over prizes, and restrict their atten-
tion to preferences that admit a Choquet Expected Utility representation on binary acts, but
are otherwise arbitrary. For a comprehensive review of the notion of ambiguity aversion,
we refer the reader to Machina and Siniscalchi (2014).
9.2 Ambiguity aversion and portfolio choice
Keynes (1921) was perhaps the first economist to grasp the full significance of uncertainty
for economic analysis and portfolio choice. Whereas conventional models of choice under
risk promote diversification, Keynes expressed the view that one should allocate wealth in
the few stocks about which one feels most favorably.20 Indeed, even though Markowitz’s
20 “As time goes on I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly
large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which
one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between
enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. [...] One’s knowledge
and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given
time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence.” See (Keynes 1983).
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idea of diversification has been accepted as one of the most fundamental tenets of modern
financial economics, empirical evidence suggests that investors do not hold diversified
portfolios but rather invest heavily in only a few assets and typically those with which
they are familiar.21 Aversion to ambiguity essentially captures tilting away from the
unknown and preference for the familiar. Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012) show
that if investors are familiar about a particular asset, they tilt their portfolio toward that
asset, while continuing to invest in other assets; that is, there is both concentration in the
more familiar asset and diversification in other assets. If investors are familiar about a
particular asset and sufficiently ambiguous about all other assets, then they will hold only
the familiar asset, as Keynes would have advocated. Moreover, if investors are sufficiently
ambiguous about all risky assets, then they will not participate at all in the equity market.
Their model also shows that when the level of average ambiguity across all assets is low,
then the relative weight in the familiar asset decreases as its volatility increases; but the
reverse is true when the level of average ambiguity is high. An increase in correlation
between familiar assets and the rest of the market leads to a reduction in the investment
in the market. And, even when the number of assets available for investment is very large,
investors continue to hold familiar assets.
Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, and Peijnenburg (2014) provide empirical evidence
that ambiguity aversion relates to five household portfolio choice puzzles: non-participation
in equity markets, low portfolio fractions allocated to equity, home-bias, own-company
stock ownership, and portfolio under-diversification. Consistent with the theory, ambi-
guity aversion is negatively associated with stock market participation, the fraction of
financial assets allocated to stocks, and foreign stock ownership, but ambiguity aversion
is positively related to owncompany stock ownership. Conditional on stock ownership,
ambiguity aversion also helps to explain portfolio under-diversification.22
Under the definition of uncertainty aversion of Schmeidler (1989), Dow and da Costa Wer-
lang (1992) derive the nonadditive analog of Arrow’s local risk neutrality theorem. With
a nonadditive probability distribution over returns on a risky asset, there is an interval
of prices within which the economic agent has no position in the asset. At prices below
the lower limit of this interval, the agent is willing to buy this asset. At prices above the
upper end of the interval, the agent is willing to sell the asset short. The highest price at
which the agent will buy the asset is the expected value of the asset under the nonadditive
probability measure. The lowest price at which the agent sells the asset is the expected
value of selling the asset short. This reservation price is larger than the other one if the
beliefs reflect uncertainty aversion a`-la-Schmeidler, that is, with a nonadditive probability
measure, the expectation of a random variable is less than the negative of the expectation
21See (De Giorgi and Mahmoud 2014) for a review of empirical evidence suggesting underdiversification.
22A number of other research efforts empirically studying the effect of ambiguity aversion on portfolio
choice reach the conclusion of under-diversification in some form, including the works of Uppal and Wang
(2003), Maenhout (2004), Maenhout (2006), Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007), Liu (2010), Campanale
(2011), and Chen, Ju, and Miao (2014).
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of the negative of the random variable. These two reservation prices, hence, depend only
on the beliefs and aversion to uncertainty incorporated in the agent’s prior, and not on
attitudes or aversion towards risk.
10 Some Concluding Behavioral Remarks
We have surveyed axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to
the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic
models. Our survey covered model-independent diversification preferences, preferences
within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general
rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty
axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory.
The traditional diversification paradigms of expected utility theory and Markowitz’s
Modern Portfolio Theory, which essentially encourage variety in investment over similar-
ity, imply that individuals are rational and risk averse. However, experimental work in
the decades after the emergence of the classical theories of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) and Markowitz (1952) has shown that economic agents in reality systematically
violate the traditional rationality assumption when choosing among risky gambles. In
response to this, there has been an explosion of work on so-called non-expected-utility
theories, all of which attempt to better match the experimental evidence. In particular,
the last decade has witnessed the growing movement of behavioral economics, which ques-
tions the assumptions of rational choice theoretic models and seeks to incorporate insights
from psychology, sociology and cognitive neuroscience into economic analysis. Behavioral
economics has had some success in explaining how certain groups of investors behave, and,
in particular, what kinds of portfolios they choose to hold and how they trade over time.
As an example, there is evidence suggesting that investors diversify their portfolio
holdings much less than is recommended by normative models of rational choice. In par-
ticular, real-world diversification appears to be highly situational and context dependent;
investors include a smaller number of assets in their portfolios than traditionally recom-
mended; and some investors exhibit a pronounced home bias, which means that they hold
only a modest amount of foreign securities. Moreover, the portfolio construction method-
ology recommended by Modern Portfolio Theory has some limitations. Consequently,
alternative diversification paradigms have emerged in practice.
Because of the empirical work suggesting that investors’ diversification behavior in real-
ity deviates significantly from that implied by various rational models of choice, behavioral
models assuming a specific form of irrationality have emerged. Behavioral economists turn
to the extensive experimental evidence compiled by cognitive psychologists on the system-
atic biases that arise when people form beliefs. By arguing that the violations of rational
choice theory in practice are central to understanding a number of financial phenomena,
new choice theoretic behavioral models have emerged.
29
Prospect Theory is arguably the most prominent such behavioral theory. It states that
agents make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the
final outcome, and that these losses and gains are evaluated using certain heuristics. The
theory can be viewed as being descriptive, as it tries to model realistic observed and doc-
umented choices rather than optimal rational decisions. The theory is due to Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and is largely viewed as a psychologically more accurate description
of decision making compared to classical theories of rational choice. Since the original
version of prospect theory gave rise to violations of first-order stochastic dominance, a
revised version, called Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), was introduced in Kahneman
and Tversky (1992). CPT overcomes this problem by using a probability weighting func-
tion derived from rank-dependent expected utility theory.
We refer the reader to De Giorgi and Mahmoud (2014) for a survey of the growing
experimental and empirical evidence that is in conflict with how diversification preferences
are traditionally viewed within classical models of choice, both under risk and under
uncertainty, such as the one reviewed in this article. A particular focus is placed on
Cumulative Prospect Theory. Unlike economic agents whose preferences are consistent
with classical frameworks such as expected utility theory or Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio
Theory, decision makers whose preferences conform to Cumulative Prospect Theory do
not select portfolios that are well-diversified. This lack of diversification essentially stems
from inherent features of CPT, in particular those of framing and convex utility in the
domain of losses.
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